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1. Introduction  
This paper addresses two questions related to the effects of the euro using highly 
disaggregated price data. First, was the change-over to the euro associated with an increase in 
prices; and second, does the euro promote greater product market integration by lowering 
cross-border transaction costs and speeding up arbitrage?  
On January 24, 2002, in the same month in which the physical euro was rolled out in 
the eurozone, the International Herald Tribune reported that “the price increases are showing 
up at cafes and supermarkets and in taxis, leading economists to speculate that the countries 
sharing the single currency may be headed for a nasty inflation surprise …”. Dziuda and 
Mastrobuoni (2006) note that around 70 percent of citizens in the 12 eurozone countries felt 
that prices had increased upon its introduction, and they provide some evidence of price 
increases. On the other hand, according to official sources (EUROSTAT, 2003), the price 
change after the introduction of the euro was either non-existent or very modest. This 
disagreement suggests another look at the data is warranted.  In contrast to existing studies, 
which rely on a before-and-after comparison around the time of the euro changeover, our 
approach to addressing the first question utilizes a difference-in-differences framework - to 
compare the change in the price levels in the eurozone countries before and after the adoption, 
with other European non-adopters during the same period.  This has the advantage of netting 
out global (e.g., oil price) or regional effects on prices that, e.g., Bergin and Glick (2006), find 
are important. This simple idea of using difference-in-differences turns out to make a 
significant difference in the conclusion: while there was indeed an increase in the prices of 
food items in the euro countries around the euro changeover, the increase was no greater than 
what could be observed in non-euro countries. 
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As a prominent euro-skeptic, Feldstein (1997) argued that the adoption of a common 
currency would impose large costs on its members in terms of the loss of flexibility of having 
separate monetary policies tailored to the needs of individual member countries. The question 
is whether the euro will promote goods market integration sufficiently and provide enough 
additional benefits to make it worth the trouble. Rose (2000), with data on the volume of trade, 
and Parsley and Wei (2003), with a metric of market integration based on price dispersion, 
conclude that currency boards or currency unions generally do provide a stimulus to goods 
market integration that goes well beyond merely reducing exchange rate volatility to zero.  
By now, enough years have passed since the physical euro was introduced in January 
2002 that a fresh examination of the data might bring more clarity to questions related to 
effects of the euro. Additional motivation for this study comes from the stated desires of 
several of the new European Union members to adopt the euro in the future. Existing 
evidence is mixed, in part because the physical launch of the euro was not the only 
development occurring around January, 2002. To name just a few, other potential influences 
on prices around this time include the spreading hoof and mouth and mad cow diseases, 
severe winter conditions, and the escalation of tensions in the middle-east subsequent to the 
terrorist attacks on the United States.  
Crucial for a study like this, is to focus on price data which relate to products that are 
physically identical, or nearly so, across countries and over time. It is well known that a 
computer in 2004 was not the same thing as a computer in 2000; so, comparing the prices of 
computers to gauge the extent of price convergence over time would be tenuous at best. 
Similarly, a typical French four-door passenger car may not be the same as a typical 
Portuguese version. Consequently, our strategy is to focus on a narrowly defined set of 
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products that are nearly identical across time and space, so as to minimize the effects of non-
comparable products on our inferences.   
Our strategy is to look at the prices of a Big Mac Meal and of its ingredients in twenty 
five European countries (twelve of whom adopted the physical euro by 2002, plus thirteen 
European countries using their own national currencies). The price of Big Mac Meals is 
informative and illustrative because it is itself a basket (the weights of its constituents can be 
easily inferred following the methodology in Parsley and Wei, 2007), and thus similar to 
national Consumer Price indexes (CPIs), but importantly it is an identical basket across 
countries, unlike CPIs compiled by national statistical agencies. An additional advantage of 
using the price of Big Mac Meals and the associated ingredients is the ability to compare price 
levels directly. Cross-country differences in price levels are impossible to measure using CPIs. 
Hence, the only cross-country conclusions one could make using CPIs concern relative 
inflation rates over time. Only under the very restrictive assumption that prices were equal in 
the base period, does information about inflation rates imply information about price levels.  
In a related study that does not examine the effects of the euro (Parsley and Wei, 
2007), we find that movements in Big Mac real exchange rates track CPI based real exchange 
rates reasonably well: that is, Big Mac real exchange rates are typically highly positively 
correlated with CPI-based real exchange rates – both in levels, and in first differences. That 
study’s sample included countries in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, the Americas, as well as several 
European countries, and found that the high correlations are not driven by high-inflationary 
episodes/countries, and that one cannot reject the hypothesis that Big Mac and CPI based real 
exchange rates are cointegrated.  In the current paper, we build upon these results and focus 
on the price and real exchange rate impacts of the euro introduction using a new data set 
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which includes the prices of Big Mac Meals, and their ingredients, in twenty-five European 
countries since 1993.  
Another important precursor to this paper is Engel and Rogers (2004), who find that 
much of the decline in European price dispersion occurred in the early 1990s, substantially 
before the introduction of the euro, and there is no additional decline post-1999 (when the 
prices began to be listed in both national currencies and the euro) or post-2002 (when the 
physical currency was introduced).  It is important to note that their data set stopped in 2003, 
and the full effects of the euro may not have materialized in so short a time. Hence it is useful 
to see whether their conclusions continue to hold in the period since 20031.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data on prices 
across Europe. Section 3 investigates the question of whether the changeover to the euro was 
associated with a jump in prices. Section 4 examines whether the changeover to the euro is 
associated with any pickup in the speed of convergence toward the law of one price. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
The price data we use in this study was compiled by Mercer Human Resource 
Consulting.2 While the price survey is similar to another produced by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), there are also some differences.  First, Mercer reports data semi-
annually (for 257 cities as of 2006) as compared to only once per year in the EIU data, and the 
                                                 
1 Beyond this question however, there are additional differences between Engel-Rogers (2004) and the current 
paper. Engel and Rogers do not examine whether there was an increase in the price level associated with the 
changeover to the euro, nor do they examine whether the speed of convergence to the law of one price has 
increased in the eurozone relative to the non-euro European countries. 
2 Information about Mercer and the Cost of Living Survey is available on-line at 
http://www.imercer.com/default.aspx?page=surveydetail&surveyid=2454&newRegionId=3 
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Mercer data report three observations per city according to where the data were collected: a 
low price outlet, a medium price outlet, and a high price outlet. We used the information from 
these three outlets as part of the data checking. In particular, we manually check the largest 
percentage price differences between the low- and medium-price outlets, and the medium- 
and high-price outlets.  We also looked at all price changes that exceed 25% in absolute value, 
that were reversed in the following period. When we could find obvious typo (e.g., a 
temporary rise in the price level by more than 500%), we used the average of the prices at t-1 
and t+1.  Similarly, we linearly interpolated data for prices missing no more than two time 
periods using the valid before and after observations.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
For this study we focus on the twenty-five European countries listed in Table 1.  The 
data is semi-annual (March and September) from September 1993, to March 2006. The ten 
(standardized by weight, volume, or by description) ingredients of Big Mac Meals we have 
data on are: beef, cheese, lettuce, onions, bread, coke, potato, labor, rent, and energy. To 
preview the results, these ingredients collectively account for 94% of the variation of Big Mac 
Meal prices in the sample. 
 
3. Does the change-over to the euro raise prices?  
Our goal in this section is to formally test whether prices increased following the 
introduction of the euro – as suspected by a majority of euro-country citizens according to 
Dziuda and Mastrobuoni (2006). What kind of economic theory could produce a price jump 
associated with the changeover the euro? One candidate is the “menu cost” theory of sticky 
prices a la Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985). If menu costs are what prevents 
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firms from making continuous adjustments to prices in response to changes in supply and 
demand, a mandatory change in currency denomination may induce firms to go straight to 
their optimal prices, rather than simply converting an old price in a national currency to a new 
price using the pre-specified exchange rate. Note that the menu cost theory would imply that 
some prices could fall (if the previous prices were set on a forward looking basis), and in any 
case, any increase in the price level should be temporary. Menu costs, or transaction costs 
more generally, might also result in ‘round number’ pricing, especially at the retail level, 
since cash transactions using round numbers involve less change-making. Moreover, since it 
is often presumed that such pricing results in rounding up, rather than rounding down, the 
euro switchover may have acted as a coordinating mechanism whereby most prices 
simultaneously got rounded up.   
Another source of euro-induced price effects has been suggested by Ehrmann (2006), 
who argues that prices might rise (at least in some sectors) due to information processing 
costs. The idea is that in areas (e.g., groceries) where consumers make a multitude of 
purchases, the costs of making price conversions from the old to the new currency can quickly 
rise.  Since firms must make the calculations only once per item, while each individual 
consumer is confronted with a differing portfolio of calculations, consumers become 
rationally inattentive. Ehrmann argues that this disparity in information processing costs can 
be exploited by firms to extract higher prices.3 Moreover these effects are increasing in the 
complexity of the currency conversion. He finds some support for this theory by comparing 
across eurozone countries (but not with non-euro countries). 
                                                 
3 Post euro introduction however, it is not clear why a conversion is relevant. That is, after the introduction of the 
euro, consumers presumably compare prices, e.g., across stores in euros, thus obviating the need for conversion.   
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As an empirical starting point we first compute average prices (in U.S. dollars) for the 
twelve eurozone countries.  The data set is a three-dimensional panel (twenty-five countries, 
twenty-six time periods, and eleven prices), which makes summarizing the price changes a bit 
challenging. Over the 1993-2006 sample period the non-traded components all recorded large 
cumulative price increases: energy costs (47%), rent (37%), and labor (46%).  The traded 
components had much wider variation: beef (13%), bread (5%), cheese (4%), Coca Cola 
(22%), lettuce (33%), onions (29%), and potatoes (71%). Somewhat surprisingly (given the 
attention it gets due to the Economist magazine articles), the average price of a Big Mac Meal 
rose 66% over the time period. 
Another useful way to summarize the data is to compare the Big Mac Meal with its 
ingredients.  In particular, in Figure 1 we plot the trends in (average) prices of the Big Mac 
Meal, and of its’ traded, and non-traded components separately. In order to construct the 
average traded-, and non-traded prices we rely on the fact that Big Mac Meals are the same 
across countries, and across time. Then, we estimate each ingredient’s implied weight in the 
Big Mac Meal ‘basket’ using all the price data and all the time periods according to 
methodology outlined in Parsley and Wei (2007). Specifically, we estimate a cost function 
and apportion shares of a Big Mac Meal’s price to each of its ingredients.4 In particular, 
suppose there are exactly n inputs; and the production function is Leontief:  
1 Big Mac Meal = min {x1, x2, ..., xn} (1)  
Let Pk,tBig Mac Meal be the price of a Big Mac Meal in country k at time t, and Pk,j,t be the 
price of input j in country k at time t. Then, 
Pk,tBig Mac Meal= ∑j Pk,j,t xj (2) 
                                                 
4 Parts of this section are based on Parsley and Wei (2007).  
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To be precise, here we use the term “input” broadly to also include an additive profit 
markup – which, without loss of generality, can be the last “input.”  That is, we could let xn=1, 
and Pk,n,t = the additive profit markup in country k at time t. Expressed in this way, equation 
(2) is an identity.  
Suppose we observe Pk,tBig Mac Meal and {Pk,j,t} for a sufficient number of time periods 
and countries, (or, to be precise, when the number of locations times the number of time 
periods ≥ n), then it is a matter of simple algebra to solve for all xi, i=1,2,..., n. In fact, a 
convenient way to solve for {x1, x2, ..., xn} would simply be a linear regression of Pk,tBig Mac 
Meal on {Pk,j,t}. The regression in this case is not a statistical tool, but an algebraic one. Since 
equation (2) is an identity, the R2 =100%. Of course, we do not literally have price 
information on every single ingredient of a Big Mac Meal. For example, we do not have 
information on cooking oil, pickles, sesame seeds, or “special sauce”. However, we assume 
that, in terms of their shares in the total cost of a Big Mac Meal, these missing items are 
relatively unimportant when compared with the items for which we do have information, such 
as beef, labor costs, rent, bread, etc.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
With these points in mind, we regress the price of a Big Mac Meal on the prices of the 
ten main inputs, and report the results in Table 2. According to the regression, 26% of the 
price of a Big Mac Meal is attributable to Beef. Collectively, tradable ingredients account for 
about 75% of the meal’s price.5  These estimated implied cost shares then are the weights we 
use when combining ingredients into traded-, and non-traded price indexes (September 
2001=100), which are plotted in Figure 1 (Panel a). In the figure, there appears to be a clear 
                                                 
5 The Big Mac Meal’s traded ingredients include: Beef, Bread, Cheese, Coke, Lettuce, Onions, and Potatoes; its 
non-traded components are: Labor, Energy, and Rent. 
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increase in prices in the eurozone subsequent to the introduction of the euro, thus confirming 
the survey results that European citizens felt there were price increases.  It is useful to note 
that these price increases cannot be attributed to quality, measurement, or aggregation issues 
that plague price indexes; that is, here we are computing the price indexes using identical 
constituents and identical weights on an unchanging, identical ‘basket’ and its inputs.  
However, it is not yet clear these price increases can be attributed to the introduction of the 
euro.  That is, the euro is but one of many possible culprits for the observed price rises.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
As an initial check, we plot the same three indexes for the European countries which 
did not adopt the euro in our sample in Panel b of Figure 1.  Immediately apparent is that, 
with the exception of non-tradeables, a similar phenomenon occurred among the non-
eurozone European countries. Since it is implausible that the introduction of the euro is 
responsible for price increases in, e.g., Bulgaria, Cyprus, Norway, etc., the figure hints that 
something else may be behind the post-2002 price increases. That said, the figure is only 
suggestive, it could still be the case that prices in the eurozone rose by a greater amount than 
prices outside the eurozone. Hence we now turn to a formal analysis that compares price 
developments within the eurozone, to those in the other European, but non-euro countries.  
For this, we use a difference-in-differences specification to minimize the chance that our 
results are related to events unrelated to the adoption of the euro. 
Formally, we do a sequence of standard t-tests over different annual horizons 
following the introduction of the euro. For completeness, we consider two events: the 
January-1999 use of the euro as an accounting currency alongside with national currencies, 
and the January-2002 actual introduction of the physical euro banknotes and coins. [For 
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Greece, the accounting euro was introduced in January 2001 but the physical euro was 
introduced at the same time as the other euro countries.] We look at the cumulative price 
change from 1998 to 1998+s, where s = 1, 2, …, 8 and compare the price change in the 
eurozone versus non-euro-zone. We do the same for the 2002 event. Specifically, for each 
product j, we define the change in price as: xs = pt+s - pt., where p is expressed in natural 
logarithms, and pt is the price at date t, just prior to the introduction of the euro (September 
1998, or September 2001). There are eight years of post-euro experience using 1999, and five 
years using 2002. We repeat this computation for each good.   
To implement a statistical test, we pool traded inputs and non-traded inputs separately, 
and for each horizon regress the percentage changes on good dummies and a euro dummy for 
countries adopting the euro.  To be clear, at each horizon we pool the percentage price 
changes for all twenty-five cities, for goods (traded/non-traded) in that category.  Thus the 
traded goods regression has 175 observations (price changes for 25 cities x 7 traded inputs); 
and there are eight horizons post 1998, and five horizons post 2001.  Similarly, for each 
horizon, the pooled nontraded regression has 75 observations (25 x 3 non-traded inputs). We 
pool the data simply to increase statistical power, and pooling traded and non-traded goods 
separately allows the estimated euro effect to differ according to whether the input was traded 
or nontraded. For each horizon, the test statistic is just the coefficient on the euro dummy in 
this pooled cross-sectional regression.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Our results are summarized in Figure 2 (panels a - f), where the percentage change in 
relative (euro/non-euro) prices is plotted (on the vertical axis) against the horizon on the 
horizontal axis).  The results strongly suggest that the introduction of the euro was not 
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associated with an increase in prices (at least none that was unique to eurozone countries), and 
our conclusion does not matter whether we date the introduction of the euro at 1999, or 2002.   
Together, the results in figures 1 and 2 beg the question: if not the euro, what was the 
reason for rising prices in Europe post-2002? Though beyond the scope of this paper, we can 
gain some insight from figures 3 and 4 (both use data from the April 2007, World Economic 
Outlook data base).  Figure 3 plots Crude oil prices since 1980, and Figure 4 plots world (non-
fuel) commodity prices. Evident in the figures is a sharp rise both in oil, and in commodity 
prices, though the more rapid price increases seem to have begun later, perhaps as late as 
2004. These figures suggest that the price movement in both euro and non-euro countries are 
consistent with global oil and commodity price movements; there is not a separate euro-
changeover effect..   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
4. Does the euro promote faster price convergence?  
A common currency can affect goods market integration by lowering transaction costs, 
eliminating exchange rate volatility, increasing trade and foreign investment, and promoting 
greater transparency in prices. In this section, we look at two different aspects of goods 
market integration. First, we ask how the cross-country dispersion of prices of the Big Mac 
Meal, and of its ingredients has evolved over time. One advantage of focusing on the Big Mac 
Meal as the aggregate here is that it allows us compare price dispersion of the aggregate, to 
the price dispersion of the constituents of that aggregate. In particular, we are interested in the 
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dispersion of both traded and nontraded ingredients, and how they might differ from or 
contribute to overall price dispersion.  
Convergence in dispersion closely corresponds to the idea of ‘ −σ convergence’, as 
described by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) in their studies of 
cross-sectional income dynamics. The use of price level observations (as opposed to price 
indexes) makes an analysis of −σ convergence possible and informative. A second aspect of 
convergence that we study in this section is the persistence of deviations from the law of one 
price for the Big Mac Meal and for each of its ingredients. This type of convergence is related 
to the concept of −β convergence in economic growth empirics. Unlike studies of 
−β convergence using CPI-based real exchange rates however, in this study it is not 
necessary to presume a base year when parity held. 
We compute the coefficient of variation for each of the Big Mac Meal’s ten inputs 
separately, and then aggregate the traded and non-traded inputs separately using the input 
share weights determined in Section 3 above.  In Figure 5, we plot cross-country price 
dispersion (as measured by the coefficient of variation) of prices for the Big Mac Meal (panel 
a), for the traded inputs (panel b), and for the non-traded inputs (panel c), over time.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
The first thing to notice is that the dispersion among the countries in the eurozone is 
uniformly lower than in other European countries even before the euro was introduced. This 
holds for the aggregate Big Mac Meal, as well as for its traded and non-traded constituents 
separately. This is consistent with larger differences in incomes, economic development, 
competitive conditions, information asymmetries, etc. among the non-euro European 
countries. Secondly, dispersion for the Big Mac Meal is very similar to that for its traded 
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inputs, and the euro/non-euro differences are wide here as well.  However, there appears to be 
more negative correlation in the trends in Big Mac Meal dispersion between euro and non-
euro countries, than for either traded or non-traded inputs.  
Two other trends appear evident from the figure. First, dispersion has fallen for non-
traded inputs in the eurozone over the entire sample, and it has also fallen for the Big Mac 
Meal for non-eurozone countries, and the trend for both has accelerated since 2000. Overall 
however, there does not appear to be a clear shift in dispersion around the time of, or even 
subsequent to the introduction of the euro.  Engel and Rogers (2004) report no tendency for 
prices to converge after January 1999 though their data set ends in 2003. There are some new 
twists in our more up-to-date data. Namely, (a) we find that non-traded input prices do 
continue to converge (for eurozone countries) after the euro introduction, and (b) we find that 
trends in dispersion in non-eurozone countries appear different from those in the eurozone, 
especially for the aggregate Big Mac Meal, and perhaps for non-traded inputs.  All in all, 
however, the euro introduction is not systematically associated with a significant drop in price 
dispersion.  
Next we turn to the persistence of deviations from the law of one price for the Big 
Mac Meal and for its ingredients. Define the (log) real exchange rate – or percentage 
deviation from the law of one price in this case – at time t as: tttt ppsq −+= * , where ts  is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange, *tp  is the foreign price of Big Mac Meals, and 
tp  is the domestic price of Big Mac Meals; all variables are expressed in natural logarithms, 
and all real exchange rates are measured relative to Germany.  
Figure 5 and the discussion surrounding price dispersion indicate that absolute price 
dispersion in non-eurozone countries is larger than in the eurozone. If transaction costs are 
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similar throughout Europe, this suggests that mean reversion may be different depending on 
whether a country is in, or out of the eurozone.  We pursue this eurozone/non-euro distinction 
further in Table 3.  Specifically, the equation estimated is: 
 
titititi qqdummiestimeandcountryq ,1,21,1, *euro εββ +++=∆ −−  (3) 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
This model is estimated by a fixed effects regression (with heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors in parentheses) for the Big Mac Meal real exchange rate, and each 
of the ten input-based real exchange rates. In this specification, 1ˆβ  measures persistence 
outside the eurozone, and 2βˆ  measures the difference between persistence in the eurozone 
versus outside, hence the sum 21 ˆˆ ββ +  measures persistence in the eurozone.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, according to Table 3, persistence in the eurozone is similar to that in non-euro 
countries except for onions, potatoes, rent, and for the Big Mac Meal real exchange rate, 
where mean reversion seems substantially higher (except for potatoes). That is, despite the 
greater dispersion outside the eurozone, mean reversion does not appear faster.  This suggests 
the euro may indeed promote greater goods market integration. However, these results may be 
misleading since we have not explicitly considered transaction costs and nonlinear adjustment. 
We turn to this next. 
A major statistical progress in the literature on the law of one price and real exchange 
rate in the last decade is the recognition that the existence of arbitrage/transaction costs 
induces a non-linearity in the convergence speed: convergence tends to be faster for a bigger 
initial departure from the long run steady state. In Table 4, we estimate persistence by 
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explicitly accounting for non-linearities in mean reversion. O’Connell and Wei (2002) and 
Sarno and Taylor (2002) argue that estimates of persistence obtained from a linear regression 
are biased upward, since such estimates are essentially averages of two regimes: very low 
speed of convergence for deviations smaller than the transaction costs, and possibly much 
faster convergence for larger deviations. These authors have addressed the problem of 
lumping data from two regimes by estimating a threshold autoregression (TAR) model. As 
O’Connell and Wei (2002) note, if transaction costs create a band of no-arbitrage, TAR 
models provide a more powerful way to detect global stationarity – even if the true price 
behavior does not conform to the TAR specification. Here, we follow Parsley and Wei (2007) 
and represent the non-linear process as an “equilibrium threshold autoregressive model” (or 
Eq-TAR for short). The basic Eq-TAR model takes the form: 
⎩⎨
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Since we reject the hypothesis that country fixed effects are zero in the linear 
specifications reported in Table 3, we remove the long run means from q prior to estimation, 
and designate the de-meaned variable as q*. According to the Eq-TAR model, convergence 
occurs toward the center of the band. TAR models allow the real exchange rate to have a unit-
root inside the transaction cost band. Once the real exchange rate exceeds the transaction cost 
parameter (c), the real exchange rate reverts at rate, β−1 . The Eq-TAR model would 
characterize behavior if fixed costs are an important part of impediments to arbitrage.  
Since we are interested in differences between eurozone and non-eurozone persistence 
we modify equation 4, and allow for (i.e., estimate) four distinct convergence parameters: (1) 
non-euro countries prior to the euro, (2) eurozone countries prior to the euro, (3) eurozone 
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countries subsequent to the introduction of the euro, and, (4) non-eurozone countries 
subsequent to the introduction of the euro.  We use 2002 as the euro introduction date here; 
our results do not differ qualitatively if we use 1999 as the cutoff. Thus the equation we 
estimate becomes:  
⎪⎩
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  (5) 
Following the discussion in Franses and van Dijk (2000), estimation is done via 
sequential conditional least squares. Procedurally, we try out a set of possible values of c one 
by one (via a grid search) and, for a given value of c, estimate a pooled OLS regression. 
Starting with an initial value of c at 0.001, the search adds 0.001 in each successive round 
until c reaches the 75th fractile of the distribution of |q*|. This results in roughly 200 
estimations per good. The model with the minimum residual sum of squares is reported in 
Table 4. Overall, the estimates of convergence are faster in these non-linear specifications, as 
one would expect. Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) report thresholds of between 8 and 10% – 
while those in the table (for de-meaned q) are generally closer to those reported in Sarno and 
Taylor (2004) and Parsley and Wei (2007), who examine more disaggregated data.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In the first four columns, the estimates for 4321 ,,, ββββ  are presented, along with their 
standard errors in parenthesis, for each of the ten inputs and for the Big Mac Meal real 
exchange rate.  In the next two columns the estimate of the size of the band (c) and the 
number of observations are given. Among tradeables, the bands are smallest for potatoes and 
onions, but curiously they are roughly the same size for non-tradeables and for the Big Mac 
Meal. Finally, in the last four columns, test statistics and p-values are given.  In particular in 
  17
the first three columns, tests of the hypothesis that mean reversion is statistically significant in 
the period given are displayed.   
There are three conclusions one can make from this table.  First, mean reversion 
among eurozone countries was already quicker than non-euro countries in the pre-2002 period, 
for most items.  Second, convergence increased for both eurozone and for non-euro countries 
in the post-2001 period. What we see is that there is generally more mean reversion in the 
post-2001 period than before (judging by the number of statistically significant coefficients).  
Finally in the last column in Table 4 we test the hypothesis that eurozone convergence 
increased by more than that in non-euro countries.  As can be seen, in only two cases do we 
reject the hypothesis of no difference in the changes (before and after the euro introduction) 
between the euro and non-euro countries; in one case the good is traded (potatoes) and the 
other is non-traded (rent).  Thus, even with the benefit of five years after the adoption of the 
euro, there does not appear to be any overwhelming evidence that mean reversion increased 
(or decreased) for eurozone countries more than other European countries. So all in all, the 
euro does not appear to be a watershed event in terms of promoting market integration among 
its member countries. After all, direct policies on dismantling trade barriers, which apply to 
non-euro European countries as well, are perhaps more important for market integration than 
the introduction of a common currency.  
 
5. Concluding thoughts  
The paper examines whether/how the adoption of a common currency in Europe 
affects the levels of prices and the speed of arbitrage. We ask two questions. The first is 
whether the changeover to the euro was accompanied, as many believe, by an increase in 
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prices of member countries.  We examine a three-dimensional panel of prices of Big Mac 
Meals and ten of its constituents, in twenty-five European countries since 1993.  In order to 
net out global or regional effects on prices not related to the adoption of the euro, we compare 
the experience of eurozone countries to non-euro European countries in a ‘difference-in-
differences’ specification. We perform statistical tests of this hypothesis for all years 
following the euro adoption and conclude there is no evidence of price increases that one can 
attribute to the adoption of the euro.  Secondly, we ask whether there is evidence that the euro 
has promoted greater product market integration by lowering cross-border transaction costs.  
We examine trends in price-level dispersion as well as in persistence of good-level real 
exchange rates, again using a difference-in-differences specification.  We find little evidence 
of significant increases in goods market integration following the introduction of the euro.  In 
conclusion, the lack of a significant euro effect on prices suggests that the adoption of a 
common currency has no significant inflationary consequence and is perhaps not as important 
as direct trade policies in promoting market integration in Europe. Of course, the adoption of 
the euro may have other benefits (or costs) that are outside the scope of this paper. 
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Figure Legends 
 
 
Figure 1: Prices in the eurozone countries  
(Panel a) 
(Panel b) 
 
Figure 2: Did the change-over to the euro raise prices?  
(Panel a) 
(Panel b) 
(Panel c) 
(Panel d) 
(Panel e) 
(Panel f) 
 
Figure 3: Oil Price Trends  
 
Figure 4: Commodity Price Trends 
 
Figure 5: Dispersion of Price levels: Eurozone versus other Europe  
(Panel a) 
(Panel b) 
(Panel c) 
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Table 1: Countries included 
 
euro non-euro 
Austria (Vienna) Bulgaria (Sofia) 
Belgium (Brussels) Cyprus (Limassol) 
Finland (Helsinki) Czech Republic (Prague) 
France (Paris) Denmark (Copenhagen) 
Germany (Frankfurt) Hungary (Budapest) 
Greece (Athens) Norway (Oslo) 
Ireland (Dublin) Poland (Warsaw) 
Italy (Rome)  Slovakia (Bratislava) 
Luxembourg (Luxembourg) Slovenia (Ljubljana)** 
Netherlands (Amsterdam)  Sweden (Stockholm) 
Portugal (Lisbon)  Switzerland (Geneva) 
Spain (Madrid)  Turkey (Istanbul) 
 United Kingdom (London) 
 
 
** Slovenia adopted the euro January 2007.  
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Table 2: Cost Function Estimation for Big Mac Meals: (1993 – 2006) 
This table reports a panel regression of the price of a Big Mac Meal on its ingredients.  1Coefficient estimates 
and standard errors (in parenthesis) are multiplied by 100, and the estimation method is random effects panel 
regression.  2The share attributed to the ith ingredient is computed as: MealMacBigii PP /βˆ , where iP  is the 
average price of the ith input.    
Coefficient Implied Cost
Traded: Estimates 1 Share (%) 2
Beef 15.520 25.9
(2.260)
Bread 34.985 17.4
(7.277)
Cheese 0.193 0.3
(1.549)
Coke 74.311 14.1
(22.768)
Lettuce 9.172 5.2
(3.276)
Onions 0.663 0.1
(11.908)
Potatoes 77.218 12.7
(14.731)
75.7
Nontraded:
Labor 7.091 12.1
(2.260)
Energy 0.097 4.7
(0.061)
Rent 0.002 1.7
(0.004)
Total = 94.3
# of observations 547
Adjusted R-squared 0.817  
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3: Persistence Estimates: Pooled Sample Euro and Non-Eurozone 
This table estimates equation 3, i.e., titititi qqdummiescountryq ,1,21,1, *euro εββ +++=∆ −−  where q is the log 
real exchange rate (relative to Germany).  The regression is performed for each ingredient as well as for the Big 
Mac Meal. Heteroskedasticity standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
observations
Beef -0.047 -0.010 0.026 590
(0.021) (0.033)
-0.057
(0.025)
Bread -0.203 -0.027 0.161 587
(0.024) (0.044)
-0.230
(0.037)
Cheese -0.235 -0.050 0.105 589
(0.036) (0.056)
-0.285
(0.043)
Coke -0.228 -0.019 0.086 590
(0.033) (0.057)
-0.248
(0.047)
Lettuce -0.622 0.143 0.245 590
(0.055) (0.076)
-0.479
(0.052)
Onions -0.059 -0.155 0.049 590
(0.019) (0.053)
-0.213
(0.049)
Potatoes -0.215 0.149 0.149 590
(0.021) (0.058)
-0.066
(0.054)
Rent -0.121 -0.261 0.063 590
(0.031) (0.069)
-0.382
(0.062)
Labor -0.279 0.018 0.114 588
(0.037) (0.059)
-0.262
(0.045)
Energy -0.284 -0.043 0.145 503
(0.034) (0.057)
-0.327
(0.045)
Big Mac Meal -0.289 -0.114 0.139 590
(0.043) (0.064)
-0.403
(0.047)
1β 2β 2R
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
21 ββ +
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Table 4: Persistence Estimates: Equilibrium TAR Specification 
 
This table presents estimates from the following equation: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−<++++
≤≤−
>++++
=∆
−−−−−
−
−−−−−
cqtnoneuroposqeuropostqeuropreqq
cqc
cqtnoneuroposqeuropostqeuroprqq
q
tttttt
tt
tttttt
t
*
1
*
14
*
13
*
12
*
11
*
1
*
1
*
14
*
13
*
12
*
11
*
if010102
if,
if,0101e02
εββββ
ε
εββββ
  
*, ** = significant at the 5%, and 10% levels respectively.   
non-euro euro euro non-euro Ho: euro - noneuro 
pre-2002 pre-2002 post-2001 post-2001 BAND OBS pre-2002 post-2001 post-2001 change = 0
Beef -0.010 -0.016 -0.092 -0.143 * 0.014 481 -0.387 -1.909 ** -3.294 * 0.350
(0.030) (0.076) (0.061) (0.057) (0.699) (0.057) (0.001) (0.555)
Bread -0.266 * 0.003 -0.071 -0.050 0.023 448 -5.320 * -4.301 * -6.018 * 0.073
(0.031) (0.058) (0.084) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.787)
Cheese -0.302 * -0.080 -0.056 0.014 0.031 450 -6.023 * -4.146 * -6.030 * 0.007
(0.060) (0.087) (0.105) (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.934)
Coke -0.265 * -0.083 -0.071 -0.053 0.018 477 -5.044 * -3.273 * -4.318 * 0.245
(0.038) (0.079) (0.110) (0.064) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.621)
Lettuce -0.731 * 0.069 0.047 -0.051 0.060 421 -8.981 * -6.988 * -9.338 * 0.067
(0.070) (0.102) (0.120) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.796)
Onions -0.022 0.005 0.004 0.027 0.010 413 -0.609 -0.469 0.170 0.430
(0.025) (0.037) (0.045) (0.021) (0.543) (0.639) (0.865) (0.512)
Potatoes 0.021 -0.012 -0.016 0.063 * 0.008 483 0.378 0.176 3.385 * 4.823 *
(0.021) (0.032) (0.036) (0.017) (0.706) (0.860) (0.001) (0.029)
Labor -0.046 -0.005 -0.029 0.005 0.007 528 -1.527 -1.684 ** -1.084 0.355
(0.032) (0.046) (0.055) (0.027) (0.127) (0.093) (0.279) (0.552)
Energy 0.074 -0.010 0.091 -0.012 0.007 555 0.944 1.751 ** 0.769 1.169
(0.068) (0.096) (0.116) (0.058) (0.345) (0.081) (0.442) (0.280)
Rent -0.146 * 0.161 * 0.154 * 0.124 0.011 370 0.319 0.136 -0.445 3.790 **
(0.043) (0.064) (0.073) (0.034) (0.750) (0.892) (0.657) (0.052)
Big Mac Meal 0.002 -0.056 -0.121 0.010 0.008 542 -0.828 -1.397 0.152 0.564
(0.068) (0.094) (0.109) (0.058) (0.408) (0.163) (0.879) (0.453)
Test statistic (p-value)Coefficient Estimates (standard errors)
Euro countries Non-euro countries
Test statistic (p-value) Test statistic (p-value)
 
 Figure 1: Prices in the eurozone countries  
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(Panel b) 
Price levels: non-eurozone countries
(September 2001 = 100)
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 Figure 2: Did the change-over to the euro raise prices?  
(Panel a) 
Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
since 2001: Big Mac Meal 
(90% confidence interval)
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(Panel b) 
Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
since 2001: Traded ingredients 
(90% confidence interval)
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
 
(Panel c) 
Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
since 2001: Big Mac Meal 
(90% confidence interval)
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 Figure 2: Did the change-over to the euro raise prices?  
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Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
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(Panel e) 
Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
since 1998: Traded ingredients 
(90% confidence interval)
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(Panel f) 
Percentage increase in prices (euro/non-euro)
since 1998: Non-Traded ingredients 
(90% confidence interval)
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Figure 3: Oil Price Trends  
 
Crude Oil (petroleum), Simple average of three spot prices 
(APSP); Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the 
Dubai Fateh, IMF-WEO
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Figure 4: Commodity Price Trends 
 
World Commodity Non-Fuel Price Index includes Food and 
Beverages and Industrial Inputs Price Indices, IMF-WEO
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  Figure 5: Dispersion of Price levels: Eurozone versus other Europe  
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(Panel b) 
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(Panel c) 
Average (weighted) Price Dispersion for 
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